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Abstract 
We study individual portfolio choice in a laboratory experiment and find strong 
evidence for heuristic behavior. The subjects tend to focus on the marginal 
distribution of an asset, while largely ignoring its diversification benefits. They follow 
a conditional 1/n diversification heuristic as they exclude the assets with an 
“unattractive” marginal distribution and divide the available funds equally between 
the remaining, “attractive” assets. This strategy is applied even if it leads to 
allocations that are dominated in terms of first-order stochastic dominance and is 
clearly irrational. In line with these findings, we find that framing and problem 
presentation have substantial influence on portfolio decisions. 
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I. Introduction 
Portfolio construction is an important economic task for individual investors 
and money managers. Modern portfolio theory, dating back to the seminal work of 
Markowitz (1952, 1959), says that an investor should optimize her portfolio’s return-
risk-exposure trade-off by carefully spreading out her scarce resources over various 
assets. Unfortunately, this task is generally quite demanding, as infinitely many 
possible combinations have to be considered. In addition, the investor has to consider 
not only the individual assets but also the statistical association between them. Indeed, 
psychological work by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), Simon (1955, 1979), Payne, 
Bettman and Johnson (1992), and many others suggests that the portfolio choice task 
may be too complex for decision makers to perform, and decision makers adopt 
various kinds of simplifying diversification heuristics in practice, as first shown by 
Simonson (1990) and Read and Loewenstein (1995).    
 The choices of participants in defined contribution pension plans are a case in 
point, as shown among others by Benartzi and Thaler (BT; 2001) and Huberman and 
Jiang (HJ; 2006). When the number of funds offered (n) is relatively small, plan 
participants seem to employ a naïve diversification strategy of investing an equal 
fraction (1/n) in all funds offered in the plan.1 Thus, the number of funds chosen 
increases as the number of funds offered increases and the fraction invested in equity 
increases as the fraction of equity funds offered increases. This behavior seems 
suboptimal, because the framing of the investment problem does not alter the 
participant’s optimal fund allocation. Furthermore, when the number of funds offered 
becomes larger, participants seem to apply the 1/n rule to a subset of the funds 
offered. For example, in the HJ study, the median number of funds chosen is three, 
compared with a median number of funds offered of 13.2 HJ refer to this phenomenon 
as the “conditional 1/n diversification heuristic.”  
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 This bias towards an equal distribution over the presented alternatives is also 
documented for many other economic decisions (see Fox and Clemen (2005), Fox, 
Ratner and Lieb (2005), and Sonnemann, Camerer, Langer, and Fox (2008)).  
2
 Similar results are found by Friend and Blume (1975), Goetzmann and Kumar 
(2005) and Polkovnichenko (2005) for individual stock portfolio holdings. They show 
that the median number of stocks held in a portfolio is two to three. 
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In this paper, we shed more light on the nature and optimality of the portfolio 
construction decision and the use of diversification heuristics. One compelling 
explanation for the conditional 1/n heuristic is that decision makers frame their 
investment decisions narrowly and assign too much weight to the marginal 
distribution of the outcomes of the individual choice alternatives.3 They may exclude 
the alternatives that are unattractive (that is, they yield small potential gains and large 
potential losses) when held in isolation, without fully accounting for their possible 
diversification benefits. Decision makers may then apply the 1/n heuristic to the 
remaining alternatives, possibly because the remaining alternatives look very similar. 
 This explanation is reminiscent of the “Elimination-By-Aspects” (EBA) 
theory (Tversky (1972)), which says that decision makers compare alternatives on 
their most salient or desirable features, and eliminate alternatives that fall short on 
these aspects. Payne (1976) and Payne, Bettman and Johnson (1993) find that 
decision makers may use simple strategies such as the EBA to reduce the choice set 
before applying a more complex, trade-off strategy to the remaining alternatives. The 
explanation is also consistent with the findings of Kroll, Levy and Rapoport (1988), 
Kroll and Levy (1992), and Dorn and Huberman (2010) who show that decision 
makers are largely insensitive to statistical association between investment 
alternatives. In addition, the explanation aligns with the Behavioral Portfolio Theory 
(BPT) of Shefrin and Statman (2000). BPT says that an investor does not consider her 
investments as one integrated portfolio but rather as a collection of narrowly framed 
sub-portfolios, each based on a separate risk-return trade-off that ignores the statistical 
association between the various sub-portfolios. 
The conditional 1/n heuristic can have substantial practical consequences. For 
example, for pension plans, this behavior may lead participants to focus on a subset of 
funds in the same, “attractive” asset class. In this respect, financial advisors stressing 
the benefits of diversification between asset classes and plans including mixed-funds 
                                                 
3
 Although we use the term narrow framing, other terms for this behavior are used in 
the literature as well. For example, Thaler (1985, 1999) speaks of mental accounting, 
and Read, Loewenstein and Rabin (1999) speak of narrow bracketing. The relevance 
of narrow framing for describing investment decisions is shown by Barberis, Huang 
and Thaler (2006), and the tendency to frame investment decisions narrowly seems 
especially pronounced for household investors (see Kumar and Lim (2008)).  
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could help improve pension investment. At the level of the aggregate capital market, 
Barberis and Huang (2001) show that a number of “anomalous” asset pricing patterns 
naturally emerge if investors care about fluctuations in individual stocks instead of 
fluctuations in their total portfolios. 
Important challenges arise when analyzing real-life investment portfolios. The 
researcher needs to know (among other things) the investor’s risk preferences, which 
assets she considers, and the expectations she has about these assets, most of which 
are generally hard to measure or control. To overcome this joint hypothesis problem, 
we use a controlled experiment among financially well-trained subjects. The 
experiment employs incentive-compatible payoffs (on average a subject earns roughly 
€50 ($75)) to ensure that subjects’ decisions have substantial consequences. 
Moreover, the experiment avoids the situation where the subject adopts a heuristic 
because the choice alternatives are not sufficiently different or to diversify away 
estimation or ambiguity risk.  
This is how our experiment works. Subjects are presented with five sets of 
assets and asked to form a portfolio from each set. To avoid specific assumptions 
about the nature of the subject’s risk preferences, and at the same time gauge the 
optimality of choices, we analyze the optimality of the chosen portfolios using the 
criterion of first-order stochastic dominance (FSD). This criterion only requires that 
the decision maker prefers more over less. FSD is a minimal requirement for rational 
behavior in expected utility theory and many non-expected utility theories, such as 
cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman (1992)) and disappointment 
aversion theory (Gul (1991)). In fact, FSD violations may be regarded as errors rather 
than genuine expression of preferences (see Tversky and Kahneman (1986), and 
Charness, Karni and Levin (2007)). Using the novel FSD portfolio efficiency tests of 
Kuosmanen (2004) (see also Kopa and Post (2009)), we can directly test if a given 
allocation is rational without knowing the precise risk preferences of the subject. To 
control for expectations and assets considered, and to minimize the cognitive 
complexity of the portfolio construction problem, we use a series of well-defined and 
simple tasks. In these tasks, subjects have to divide their money between a small 
number of assets, or “lotteries”, with a small number of equally likely states with 
known outcomes. One of the lotteries is very unattractive when held in isolation, but 
very attractive for diversification purposes due to a negative statistical association 
with the other lotteries. Another lottery is more attractive in isolation, but very 
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unattractive for diversification purposes. In fact, the inclusion of this lottery in one’s 
portfolio will lead to substantial violations of FSD portfolio efficiency. These lotteries 
are included to test the hypothesis that decision makers overweight the marginal 
distribution and underweight the features of the joint distribution. 
The use of the FSD portfolio efficiency criterion is an innovation in this 
literature. This criterion has several advantages for experimental research; it places no 
restrictions on risk attitudes (it even allows for risk seeking); it is invariant to 
subjective distortions of cumulated probabilities; and it is invariant to the initial 
wealth level (and hence not affected by “endowment effects”). In contrast to our 
approach, previous experiments analyzing diversification behavior either (i) design 
the choice problems such that only one efficient alternative exists (Rubinstein (2002)), 
(ii) test if the partition of the choice set affects decisions (Langer and Fox (2004)), 
without investigating the efficiency of the decisions, or (iii) test the efficiency of 
subject’s portfolio choices using the mean-variance or second-order stochastic 
dominance (SSD) criterion (Kroll, Levy and Rapoport (1988), Kroll and Levy (1992), 
and Levy, Levy and Alisof (2004)).4  
We stress that testing optimality is not our end goal. Given the limited 
computational ability of the human mind, and the general complexity of the 
diversification task, it may not be reasonable to expect completely rational choice to 
begin with, even for our relatively simple tasks. Rather, our objective is to detect 
patterns in the deviations from optimality in individual portfolio construction 
decisions, to explain these patterns and to analyze the effect of the framing of the 
diversification problem. 
Our findings are as follows. A large majority of our subjects focus on a subset 
of the lotteries, where the subsets chosen are consistent with the idea that investors 
focus on the marginal distribution of the individual choice alternatives. The subjects 
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 Kroll, Levy and Rapoport (1988) and Kroll and Levy (1992) study experimentally 
the second-order stochastic dominance (SSD) efficiency of portfolio choices when 
diversifying between three possible risky assets, with different degrees of correlation, 
and between three risky assets and one riskless asset.  Levy, Levy and Alisof (2004) 
experimentally test the SSD efficiency of portfolio choices when diversifying between 
one of five to nine possible risky mutual funds and a riskless fund, in order to 
investigate the homemade leverage decision.  
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exclude the lotteries that are unattractive when held in isolation, without fully 
accounting for their possible diversification benefits. Subsequently, many subjects 
tend to select an equal-weighted combination of the remaining lotteries, and this 
conditional 1/n heuristic is applied even if it is highly irrational in terms of FSD 
portfolio inefficiency. By contrast, only a few subjects select an even allocation across 
all lotteries, contradicting the unconditional 1/n rule. Consistent with this heuristic 
behavior, we find that framing has a substantial influence on portfolio construction 
decisions (similar to the findings of Langer and Fox (2004), and Benartzi, Peleg and 
Thaler (2007)). Emphasizing the diversification benefits rather than the marginal 
distribution of the individual choice alternatives improves the decisions considerably. 
In other words, subjects don’t fully appreciate the effect of diversification unless these 
effects are clearly pointed out to them. Moreover, adding irrelevant alternatives 
influences portfolio decisions, further suggesting that problem presentation has an 
important effect on individual portfolio decisions.  
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section II discusses the 
experimental design and implementation. Section III discusses our results. Finally, 
Section IV presents our conclusions. 
 
 
II. Experimental Design 
 
A. Lotteries 
Our experiment consists of five main tasks (Task 1-5), each of which contains 
three or four out of six base lotteries (B1-B6), as shown in Table 1.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Several remarks are in order to explain our research design. First, to limit the 
cognitive complexity of the choice problems, we focus on a small number of base 
lotteries and a small number of scenarios. Specifically, the first three tasks use three 
base lotteries (X1, X2 and X3) with a payoff in three possible scenarios (S1, S2 and S3). 
Three is the minimum number of lotteries needed to distinguish between the 
unconditional version of the 1/n rule (which yields an even allocation across three 
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base lotteries) and the conditional version (which yields an even allocation across two 
base lotteries). We need at least three scenarios to avoid perfect linear dependence 
between the lotteries. The remaining two tasks add one redundant lottery (X4) to the 
three main base lotteries, allowing us to investigate the framing effects caused by the 
addition of irrelevant alternatives.  
Second, the subjects may diversify between the three base lotteries. 
Obviously, this substantially increases the complexity of the problem, because there 
are infinitely many combinations. To limit this complexity we focus on the convex 
hull of the base lotteries, or the case where all convex combinations of the base 
lotteries allowed: 
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with w1, w2 and w3 for the weights assigned to X1, X2 and X3 respectively. In this 
setup, negative positions are not allowed (no short sales), the weights must sum to 
unity (no riskless alternative) and no further restrictions are placed on the weights. 
Short sales possibilities and the availability of a riskless alternative would 
substantially increase the complexity and cognitive burden of the choice problem, and 
are therefore not permitted in our experiment. 
Third, to further limit the computational complexity of the diversification task 
we use equal and moderate probabilities of 31  for every scenario. This approach also 
helps to reduce the possible effects of probability distortion, but it need not fully 
eliminate these effects. For example, Cumulative Prospect Theory with the functional 
specification and parameter values of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) predicts that the 
lowest (negative) outcome of each lottery is transformed from 31  to 0.35, the middle 
(positive) outcome to 0.18 and the highest (positive) outcome to 0.34. Importantly, the 
FSD rule is invariant to subjective transformation of the cumulative probabilities and 
our inferences based on this criterion are not likely to be affected by probability 
distortion. 
Fourth, to ensure that the experiments resemble real-life investment choices, 
all base lotteries are “mixed gambles” that involve both gains and losses. Further, no 
combination of the base lotteries yields only gains. In this way we hope to avoid 
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situations in which subjects take more risk, because they have no possibility to lose 
money – the “house-money effect.” This possible effect is consistent with our use of 
the FSD criterion (which places no restrictions on risk attitudes), but it would reduce 
the propensity to diversify and hence lower the power of our experiments.  
Fifth, a subject may use the 1/n rule or conditional 1/n rule simply because the 
choice alternatives are not sufficiently different given her preferences. For example, a 
risk-neutral subject will be indifferent between alternatives that yield the same 
average outcome, irrespective of possible differences in the distribution of the 
outcomes. To ensure that the allocations have a substantial effect on the probability 
distribution of the outcomes, and the FSD criterion has discriminating power, the base 
lotteries are constructed in such a way that they exhibit significant differences in 
mean, dispersion and ranking of the outcomes in order.  
 
B.  Tasks 
In Task 1, where (X1, X2, X3) = (B1, B2, B3), Lottery B3 has an unfavorable 
marginal distribution; it is FSD-dominated by B1 since it involves a lower minimum (-
75 vs. -50), the same median (+25) and a lower maximum (+50 vs. +125). Also, B3 
has limited value as a diversifier to risk averters, because it has a strong positive 
statistical association with lotteries B1 and B2.  
In Task 2, where (X1, X2, X3) = (B1, B2, B4), B3 is replaced with B4, which plays 
an important role in the experiment. B4 is in fact a permutation of B3 and these two 
lotteries have the same marginal distribution. Hence, B4 is again FSD-dominated by 
B1 when held in isolation. Still, B4 should be of interest to risk averters, because in 
contrast to B3 it has a negative statistical association with lotteries B1 and B2, yielding 
possible diversification benefits. Interestingly, B2 is FSD dominated by the simple 
combination of investing 75 percent in B1 and 25 percent in B4, because it involves the 
same minimum (-25) and median (0), but a higher maximum (+100 vs. +75) 
Furthermore, every combination that contains a positive allocation to B2 is FSD 
dominated by some combination of B1 and B4. Subjects focusing only on the 
alternatives with attractive marginal distributions are likely to oversee the 
diversification benefits of B4 and make inefficient choices.  
In Task 3, where (X1, X2, X3) = (B1, B2, B5), B4 is replaced with B5, the equal-
weighted average of B1 and B4, that is, =5B 421121 BB + . This merely cosmetic change 
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reduces the choice set by excluding implied allocations to B4 greater than to B1, 
“hides” the unfavorable marginal distribution of B4, and emphasizes the 
diversification benefits from combining B1 and B4. In fact, B5 has the same marginal 
distribution as B2, but it offers greater diversification possibilities due to the negative 
statistical association with B1. 
In Task 4 and Task 5, we reframe the portfolio construction problem by adding 
one simple, but irrelevant alternative to earlier tasks. In Task 4, where (X1, X2, X3, X4) 
= (B1, B2, B4, B6), we add B6, an equal weighted combination of B1 and B2 (that 
is, =6B 221121 BB + ), to Task 2. In Task 5, where (X1, X2, X3, X4) = (B1, B2, B5, B6), we 
add B6 to Task 3. These additions do not alter the choice set and formal choice 
problem, and should have no influence on choices.5 
 
C.  FSD Portfolio Efficiency Test 
We analyze each subject’s choices using the criterion of First-order Stochastic 
Dominance (FSD) efficiency. A typical problem in gauging the outcomes of choice 
experiments (as well as real-life choices) is that the preferences of the subjects are not 
(fully) known or are constructed at the moment of the decision (Payne, Bettman and 
Johnson (1992), and Slovic (1995)). This makes it difficult to establish if observed 
diversification behavior is rational and to what degree. The criterion of FSD 
circumvents this problem, because it does not require a precise specification of the 
preferences of the decision maker and applies for a broad class of preferences. 
                                                 
5
 In addition, we presented four additional tasks (Task 6 to Task 9) to the subjects. 
These tasks test the effect of adding the irrelevant alternative B7, an equal weighted 
combination of B2 and B3 (that is, =7B 321221 BB + ), to Tasks 2 to 5. These additions 
do not alter the efficient choice sets, although some highly inefficient allocations, as 
compared to Task 3, with more weight assigned to B4 than to B1 are made possible. 
The results of Task 6 to 9 reveal similar behavioral patterns as we find in Task 2 to 5 
(see next section). Subjects focus on the marginal distributions, thereby largely 
ignoring diversification benefits, and divide their money equally between the selected 
alternatives. Moreover, emphasizing diversification benefits improves choices, while 
adding irrelevant alternatives deteriorates choices. These tasks and results are omitted 
here for the sake of brevity. More details are available from the authors upon request. 
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According to the traditional definition, a choice alternative with cumulative 
distribution function )(xF  FSD dominates another alternative with cumulative 
distribution function )(xG  if and only if G(x)F(x) ≤  for all x with a strong inequality 
for at least some x. Since FSD only requires that people prefer more over less, it is a 
minimal requirement for rational behavior, both in expected utility theory and many 
non-expected utility theories (for example CPT). Descriptively, FSD also appears a 
valid criterion, because subjects seldom select an alternative that is FSD dominated if 
the dominance is easily detected, and FSD violations may be regarded as errors rather 
than genuine expression of preferences (Tversky and Kahneman (1986), and 
Charness, Karni and Levin (2007)). 
To analyze the FSD efficiency of choices we use the recently developed 
Kuosmanen (2004) and Kopa and Post (2009) mathematical programming tests for 
determining if a given portfolio is FSD efficient relative to all possible portfolios 
formed from a set of assets.6 A rational decision-maker has no preference for a 
specific ranking of outcomes over the various states of the world ceteris paribus. For 
example, a lottery that yields $100 when tails are due and $0 when heads are due FSD 
dominates a lottery that pays off $0 when tails are due and $50 when heads are due. 
This holds notwithstanding the opposite rankings of both lotteries within each state of 
the world. More general, Lottery X dominates Lottery Y by FSD if and only if all 
outcomes of X are larger than or equal to all outcomes of at least some permutation of 
Y. Therefore, the FSD portfolio efficiency tests evaluate not only the outcomes of the 
chosen allocation, but also the outcomes of all permutations of the chosen allocation.  
When applied to our experiment, the FSD efficiency test statistic, or 
“inefficiency score”, for a given allocation )( 321 ,w,ww  is computed by solving the 
following mixed integer linear programming problem: 
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 In our experiment, with only three scenarios, the two tests are identical. There is, 
however, a subtle difference between the two tests: Kuosmanen asks if the given 
portfolio is FSD non-dominated by all alternative portfolios; Kopa and Post ask if the 
given portfolio is optimal for any non-satiable investor.  
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This problem seeks an allocation )( 321 z,z,z  with outcomes that are greater than or 
equal to the outcomes of the chosen allocation )( 321 w,w,w  or some permutation of 
those outcomes. The outcomes are denoted by 3 1=j,iijx }{  and the permutation of the 
outcomes is represented by the binary variables 3 1=j,ssjp }{ . The inefficiency score 
)(
321 w,w,wθ  has the compelling interpretation of the maximum possible increase in 
the mean outcome that can be achieved with a combination that FSD dominates the 
evaluated combination. Thus, if the inefficiency score takes a value of zero, the 
evaluated combination is FSD efficient; if it takes a strictly positive value, the 
combination is FSD inefficient. 
To illustrate the working of the FSD portfolio efficiency test in the context of 
our experiment, consider a subject who excludes B4 from her choice set and divides 
her money evenly between B1 and B2, that is, )( 02121 ,, , in Task 2. As shown in Table 
2, a combination with 87  allocated to B1 and 81  to B4 or )( 8187 0,,  dominates this 
combination. In Scenarios S1 and S2, the outcomes remain -37.5 and +12.5, 
respectively. However, in S3, the outcome increases from +100 to +112.5, leading to a 
possible increase of the mean of =)( 02121 ,,θ 614 . Hence, a subject who applies the 
conditional 1/n rule to lotteries B1 and B2 in Task 2 makes an FSD inefficient choice, 
as she forgoes at least 614  in terms of mean outcome.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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A remark on computational complexity seems in order here. Testing if a given 
combination is FSD efficient requires the above mixed-integer programming. In 
addition, delineating the entire FSD efficient set is complicated by the fact that the 
efficient set is often not convex; combining two FSD efficient combinations does not 
always yield an FSD efficient combination. These complications stem from the fact 
that the subject’s preferences are not known to the analyst and that very diverse 
preferences are admitted under the FSD rule. These issues complicate the testing of 
FSD efficiency for the analyst, but for the individual subject this problem is less 
relevant, because only her personal preferences are relevant for her decision and these 
preferences are known to her. We do not claim that the subject faces a simple 
problem, but rather that she presumably doesn’t apply the FSD rule and restricts her 
attention to her own preference rather than the entire set of preferences that is 
admitted by the FSD rule. 
 
D.  FSD Efficient Portfolios 
Graph A of Figure 1 shows the inefficiency scores (“the maximum possible 
increase in the mean given risk”) for all feasible combinations of w1 and w2 in Task 1. 
The weight w3 is not shown, because it can be found as the residual 213 1 www −−= .  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Despite the generality of the FSD criterion, the efficient set (all combinations 
with a zero inefficiency score) is only a small subset of the entire choice set. For this 
task, the efficient set is given by:  
 
(3) [ ]( ) [ ]( ){ }0110101 3121132511321 =−=∈∪−==∈= w;ww;,www;w;,w:w,w,wW*1 )(  
 
In other words, investing 20 percent or more in B1 and the remainder in B3, or, 
alternatively, combining B1 and B2, is efficient. Full investment in B1 is clearly 
efficient as it maximizes the expected pay-off. Some subjects should combine B1 with 
B2, or even invest everything in B2, to reduce their downside risk. Other subjects 
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should combine B1 with B3 to create more upside potential in scenario S2. However, 
B3 has an unfavorable marginal distribution, with the largest loss, smallest gain, and 
lowest expected value, and a large allocation to B3 is non-optimal for any subject. 
Indeed, the lowest inefficiency score is achieved with full allocation to B3; 
3
133100 =)( ,,θ . Note that B2 is attractive for a very different preference class than B3, 
and mixing B2 and B3 is non-optimal for every rational subject. Using the 
unconditional 1/n heuristic of investing an even amount in each alternative )( 313131 ,,  is 
highly inefficient, with an inefficiency score of  21313131 16=)( ,,θ . 
In Task 2, B3 is replaced with B4, a simple permutation of B3. This 
replacement has an important effect on the efficient set, since it introduces new 
diversification benefits for risk averters. Graph B of Figure 1 shows the FSD 
inefficiency scores. We will denote the allocations chosen in Task 2 by y1, y2 and y3 
for sake of comparability with later tasks. Specifically, the efficient set in Graph B of 
Figure 1 is given by: 
 
(4)  { }21328541811321 101 yyy,y,,,y:y,y,yW * 2 −−==∪∈=
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Allocating a non-zero percentage to B2 now is FSD inefficient. B3 and B4 have 
the same, unattractive marginal distribution and the largest inefficiency score is 
achieved with full allocation to B4; 3133100 =)( ,,θ . Nevertheless, allocating a small 
fraction ( 833 ≤y ) or a large fraction ( 87343 ≤< y ) to B4 and the remainder to B1 is 
efficient. Due to the negative statistical association between B1 and B4, a risk averse 
subject should now mix B1 and B4 rather than B1 and B2. Notably, the simple 
combination of investing 75 percent in B1 and 25 percent in B4 yields the same 
outcomes as B2 in S1 and S2 and a better outcome in S3 (+100 vs. +75). Full investment 
in B2 therefore yields an inefficiency score of 318010 =)( ,,θ  (or 50 percent of the 
expected payoff of €16.67) in Task 2. Moreover, subjects applying the conditional 
diversification heuristic to B1 and B2 leave €4.17 ( 612121 40 =)( ,,θ ) on the table, and the 
unconditional 1/n rule yields an inefficiency score of 95313131 5=)( ,,θ . 
Graph C of Figure 1 shows the results for Task 3. In this task, B4 is replaced 
with B5, or the equal-weighted average of B1 and B4, that is, =5B 421121 BB + . This 
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purely cosmetic change reduces the choice set by excluding allocations to B4 greater 
than the allocations to B1. Moreover, it “hides” the unfavorable marginal distribution 
of B4, while stressing the diversification benefits from combining B1 and B4 over B2. 
For the sake of comparability with Task 2 (Graph B of Figure 1), we will transform 
the allocations chosen in Task 3 to their implied Task 2 weights; y1 includes both the 
direct allocation to B1 and half of the allocation to B5. Thus, if 21  is allocated to B1 and 
2
1
 to B5, we have 431 =y .  
Compared with Graph B of Figure 1, the most inefficient alternatives, which 
involve a relatively high allocation to B4, are now eliminated. The inefficiency score 
reaches its maximum at )( 010 ,,  and )( 2121 0,, . Indeed, B2 and B5 have the same 
marginal distribution and hence full allocation to one of these two lotteries yields the 
same inefficiency score; 312121 80010 == )()( ,,,, θθ . However, B5 is more attractive for 
diversification purposes, implying that all combinations with a non-zero allocation to 
B2 are inefficient. In addition, large allocations to B5 ( 833 >y ) are also inefficient. 
Specifically, the efficient set for Task 3 is given by 
 
(5)  { }2132851321 101 yyy;y;,y:y,y,yW * 3 −−==∈=
][)(
 
 
As before, the unconditional naïve diversification heuristic of investing an 
even allocation in each alternative )( 313131 ,,  is inefficient for every subject in Task 3, 
with an inefficiency score of 97313131 2=)( ,,θ .   
In Task 4 (Task 5), we add the equal weighted combination of B1 and B2 (that 
is, =6B 221121 BB + ) to Task 2 (Task 3). These additions keep the efficient choice set 
exactly the same, implying that Equation (4) (Equation (5)) gives the efficient set, 
formulated in terms of implied Task 2 allocations. For Task 4, the inefficiency scores 
are shown in Graph B of Figure 1, while the values for Task 5 are shown in Graph C 
of Figure 1. Similar to Task 2 (Task 3), allocations to B2 are inefficient in Task 4 
(Task 5). In addition, B6 consist for 50 percent of B2 and positive allocations to this 
lottery similarly result in inefficient allocations. 
 
E.  Subjects and Procedures 
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In total, 107 third and fourth year undergraduate students of economics and 
financial economics participated. These students were recruited during advanced 
courses on portfolio theory or financial economics. At that stage of their studies, the 
students have completed at least two basic courses in statistics, microeconomics and 
finance and thus were familiar with formal decision making, probabilistic calculus 
and portfolio theory. In fact, a formal requirement to participate in these courses is 
that subjects successfully completed a course on Markowitz portfolio theory.  
The Appendix shows the format in which the tasks were presented to the 
subjects (translated from Dutch to English).7 Answering the diversification 
questionnaire took the subjects on average roughly one hour. The choices were filled 
out on a paper form that could only be handed in after all tasks were completed. 
Therefore, the choices of previous tasks remained available to the subjects during the 
course of the experiment. In addition, all subjects brought or received a pocket 
calculator to help them in performing the necessary calculations. 
The test form includes an example to illustrate the objective of the tasks, to 
emphasize that the percentages should sum to 100 percent, and to illustrate how a 
chosen allocation affects the distribution of gains and losses. To avoid unintended 
anchoring effects, the percentages printed on every form were randomized. Further, 
the test form shown in the Appendix uses a particular ordering for the tasks, lotteries 
and scenarios. To avoid any unintended ordering effects (for instance, the subjects 
focusing on the first lottery or losing concentration in the last task), the actual test 
forms used randomized orderings. An unreported follow-up analysis reveals no 
significant effects of the example percentages or the ordering of the tasks, lotteries 
and scenarios. 
We use incentive-compatible payoffs. Specifically, the subjects were told that 
one of the nine tasks is selected at random and played for real money at the end of the 
experiment. Each task is equally likely to be selected. This incentive scheme has 
proven to be an effective tool in static decisions problems like ours, since it avoids 
income effects while the incentives in each task are not diluted by the probability of 
payout (see Starmer and Sugden (1991), and Cubitt, Starmer and Sugden (1998)). 
                                                 
7
 The original experiment also included Task 6 to Task 9; see Footnote 5. Since our 
main text does not discuss the results of these tasks, the Appendix also excludes these 
tasks for the sake of brevity.   
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Since there is a possibility that subjects would lose money we asked each subject to 
bring €25 to the experiment. We explicitly stressed this possibility before the start of 
the experiment, to make sure the subjects were fully aware of this. Also, to cover 
possible losses, each subject received an attendance fee of €10 and received €15 for 
participating in another 30 minute questionnaire which took place after the current 
experiment, a similar procedure as in Ackert, Charupat, Deaves and Kluger (2009).  
After each subject completed her tasks, we handled the payments by calling 
the subjects forward, asking them to put their home brought €25 on table and 
throwing dices to determine their earnings. Hence, subjects could only lose out-of-
pocket money if they were willing to take the risk of loosing more than €25 in an 
individual task.8 The average subject took home roughly €50 (≈$75), which in our 
view is a large amount and incentive for participating in a one-and-a-half hour lasting 
experiment. 
In a preliminary experiment without choice-related monetary incentives, we 
found many errors of computation, suggesting that the subjects paid less attention 
without monetary rewards. In this experiment, with monetary rewards, no-one opted 
not to participate after reading the instructions, made serious miscalculations or did 
not fill in the amounts allocated to each lottery, leaving us with a final sample of 107 
subjects. The experiment reported here actually replaces an earlier, similar experiment 
in which some of the subjects were randomly selected to play for real money – 
“between-subject” rather than “within-subject” selection. This incentive scheme was 
                                                 
8
 A possible objection to this incentive scheme is that it may stimulate subjects to 
invest 100% in B2 or B5 to avoid paying out-of-pocket money. The largest possible 
loss in these lotteries is -€25 and can be paid from the €25 that the subjects earned by 
participating in the experiment and questionnaire. However, the results in the next 
section show that only few subjects invest 100% in B2 or B5. Hence, most subjects 
deliberately expose themselves to substantial possible out-of-pocket losses. More 
importantly, our results are based on the FSD rule, which is invariant to endowments. 
Notably, in Task 2 (Task 3) B2 is FSD-dominated by the relatively simple 
combination of investing 75% in B1 and 25% in B4 (50% in B1 and 50% in B5). These 
strategies perform never worse than B2 and yield a €8.33 (or 50%) higher expected 
payoff in both tasks. Hence, they are clearly superior to investing 100% in B2 for 
subjects who want to avoid out-of-pocket losses.  
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abandoned, because the perceived incentives may be smaller than originally intended 
(see Baltussen, Post, Van den Assem and Wakker (2009)). Encouragingly, the earlier 
experiments lead to the same behavioral patterns and conclusions as reported here. 
 
F. Statistical Procedure 
Our experimental design involves a series of tasks, each of which replaces or 
adds one (carefully designed) lottery at a time. Every subject completes the same set 
of tasks, presented in a randomized order and under a randomized payment scheme. 
Therefore, our research design allows for pair-wise comparisons between the tasks 
and the use of elementary statistical methods.  
Part of our analysis will employ these pair-wise comparisons. For comparing 
single proportions between two tasks (for example, the percentage of allocations that 
are classified as FSD efficient) we will use a simple paired t-test for the difference in 
population proportions. Reassuringly, similar results are obtained when non-
parametric Wilcoxon signed-ranked or sign tests are used. For comparing entire 
allocations, which involves comparing multiple portfolio weights simultaneously, we 
use Hotelling’s paired T-squared test (see Hotelling (1947)). Section 2.1 to 2.5 will 
use these pair-wise comparisons between the tasks. 
While pair-wise comparisons are valid in our experiment, more statistical 
power can be obtained by pooling all tasks and using multivariate regression analysis 
to jointly analyze the various effects in our experiment. Section 2.6 applies the 
multivariate regression techniques to the pooled dataset. 
 
 
III. Results  
 
Table 3 and Figure 2 summarize the chosen allocations in Task 1 to Task 5. In 
what follows we elaborate on the results of each of these tasks.   
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
A.  Task 1 
 16 
Table 3 and Graph A of Figure 2 show the results of Task 1 (diversification 
between B1, B2 and B3). Many subjects allocate 100 percent to B1 (17.8 percent) or 
100 percent to B2 (28.0 percent). Another large group (38.3 percent) mixes B1 with B2. 
Most subjects (84.1 percent) exclude B3 from their choice set. Apparently, B3 is 
sufficiently unattractive for most subjects to exclude it from their portfolios. Most of 
the inefficient choices arise due to mixing B1 with both B2 and B3 rather than with 
either B2 or B3. The overall efficiency percentage is high (85.0 percent). Still, due to 
the generality of the FSD criterion, the efficient choices may include non-optimal 
choices. For example, the FSD test will always classify the maximizing of the mean 
(choosing B1 alone) as efficient, even if diversification is optimal for a given investor.   
Only 0.9 percent of the subjects choose the equal-weighted allocation ),,( 313131  
and hence the unconditional 1/n rule does not apply here. By contrast, the subjects do 
exhibit a bias towards the equal-weighted average of B1 and B2. Specifically, almost a 
third (29.2 percent) of the 38.3 percent who mix B1 and B2 (or 11.2 percent of all 
respondents) choose the even allocation 221121 BB + .
9
 However, due to this allocation 
being FSD efficient, we cannot determine if this strategy is irrational, and, if so, to 
what extent. Overall, a substantial number of subjects focus on two lotteries and 
divide their money equally between these lotteries (12.1 percent).   
 Task 2 and Task 3 shed further light on the optimality of and the rationale 
behind the observed portfolio decisions. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
B. Task 2 
In the second task (see Table 3 and Graph B of Figure 2), B3 is replaced with 
B4, leading to (X1, X2, X3) = (B1, B2, B4). Since B4, in contrast to B3, has a negative 
statistical association with B1 and B2, this replacement leads to a substantial 
improvement in the choice possibilities. Thus, we may expect significant changes in 
                                                 
9
 Allocations are classified as “even allocation” if the allocations to each selected 
alternative fall within a range of 5% around the even allocation, that is, 
{ } 05010 .)ii:w(countiw ≤−>− .  
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the allocations. Surprisingly, many subjects seem to overlook the diversification 
possibilities and they select inefficient portfolios.  
A relatively large group (15.0 percent) still allocates 100 percent to B1. Since 
this strategy maximizes the expected outcome, this choice remains efficient. In 
contrast, only a relatively small group (9.3 percent) now allocates 100 percent to B2. 
The average allocation to B2 falls from 54.2 percent to 31.1 percent, while the average 
allocation to B1 increases from 42.9 percent to 51.8 percent, resulting in significantly 
different allocations between Task 1 and Task 2 (p-value = 0.0000). Unlike in Task 1, 
most subjects choose two or three alternatives (37.4 percent and 38.3 percent). It is 
remarkable that most of the subjects who choose two alternatives still choose some 
combination of B1 and B2, with no weight assigned to B4 (18.7 percent of all 
respondents). Since mixing B1 and B2 is inferior to mixing B1 and B4, these strategies 
are now inefficient.10 Our interpretation for these findings is that the relatively 
unfavorable marginal distribution of B4 leads many subjects to exclude this lottery 
from the choice set, thereby ignoring its possible diversification benefits. In fact, 
many subjects inefficiently exclude B4 from their choice set (43.0 percent), while 
most include B2 (66.4 percent), supporting this interpretation.  
Apart from mixing B1 and B2 instead of B1 and B4, the subjects also exhibit a 
strong bias towards the equal-weighted average of B1 and B2. Overall, 49.7 percent of 
the mixtures of B1 and B2 are evenly allocated. This is again is a strong indication for 
a conditional version of the 1/n rule. However, the difference with Task 1 is that these 
choices are demonstrably inefficient, as every allocation to B2 yields an inefficient 
choice in Task 2. More evidence for the popularity of the conditional 1/n rule is given 
by the substantial fraction (45.2 percent) of even allocations among the subjects who 
choose a combination of B1 and B4. Of the subjects who invest in two funds, 47.5 
percent (17.8 percent of all respondents) choose an even allocation and overall 17.8 
percent of the subjects choose an equally weighted allocation among two chosen 
lotteries. By contrast, only 2.8 percent of the subjects seem to apply the unconditional 
1/n heuristic.  
This remarkable behavior results in roughly three quarters of the subjects (78.5 
percent) selecting an FSD inefficient allocation. Recall that the FSD criterion is very 
                                                 
10
 B2 is FSD dominated by investing 75% in B1 and 25% in B4, which yields a €8.33 
(or 50%) higher expected value than B2. 
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general (it even allows for “exotic” patterns of risk seeking behavior) and that the true 
number of non-optimal choices may even be larger than reported here. Moreover, the 
average inefficiency score is €3.76, meaning that the average subject leaves at least 
€3.76, or 16.7 percent of the expected value, on the table. Given the generality of the 
FSD rule and the relatively simple structure of the experiment, it is quite surprising 
that such a large group can be classified as inefficient and make such economically 
significant mistakes.  
As mentioned before, one possible interpretation for these findings is that the 
relatively unfavorable marginal distribution of B4 leads the subjects to exclude this 
lottery from their choice set, thereby ignoring its possible diversification benefits. The 
outcomes of Task 3 (which replaces B4 with B5 421121 BB += ) in Graph C of Figure 2 
further support this interpretation. To interpret Graph C of Figure 2, recall that 1y  
includes both the direct allocation to B1 and half of the allocation to B5 
( 421121 BB += ). 
 
C.  Task 3 
As explained in Section 1.4, Task 3 uses (X1, X2, X3) = (B1, B2, B5), which 
reduces the choice options and does not allow for allocations that improve on those 
available in Task 2. In addition, in Task 2, only few subjects (3.7 percent) assign a 
higher weight to B4 than to B1 and hence choose an allocation that is not feasible in 
Task 3. Thus, assuming rational behavior, we may expect only minimal differences 
between the choices in Task 2 and Task 3. Interestingly, the two tasks 
yield surprisingly different results.  
As in Task 1 and 2, a large group (15.0 percent) allocates 100 percent to B1. 
Since this strategy still maximizes the expected outcome, this choice remains 
efficient. However, surprisingly large changes are observed for the 
remaining subjects. Specifically, compared with Task 2, only a small group  
(1.8 percent) chooses a combination of B1 and B2, with no weight assigned to B5. 
The subjects generally reduce their allocation to B2 and increase their 
allocation to B1 (by choosing B5), clearly suggesting that framing matters. The 
average implied allocation to B2 falls from 31.1 percent to 16.9 percent, while the 
average implied allocation to B1 increases from 51.8 percent to 65.3 percent, resulting 
in significantly different allocations between Task 2 and Task 3 (p-value = 0.0000). 
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Only few subjects (1.8 percent) mix B1 and B2, while relatively many (35.5 percent) 
mix B1 and B5. Hence, it seems that emphasizing the diversification advantages of B4 
over B2, by presenting a reframed version of B4, makes B2 look less attractive. The 
increased number of subjects who completely exclude B2 from their choice set (from 
33.6 percent to 54.2 percent, p-value = 0.0012) gives further support for this. 
Moreover, only 3.7 percent of the subject ignore B5 in Task 3, while 27.0 percent 
ignore B4 in Task 2 (p-value = 0.0001). By doing so, many of the inefficient 
allocations that are chosen in Task 2 (and that remain feasible in Task 3) are replaced 
with efficient choices. In total, the number of inefficient choices decrease 
substantially from 78.5 percent to 49.5 percent (p-value = 0.0000) and the mean 
inefficiency score for all subjects reduces to €1.73, or 7.0 percent of the expected 
value (was 16.7 percent). Also, of the 84 subjects who made inefficient choices in 
Task 2, only 50 make inefficient choices in Task 3, an improvement of 40.5 percent. 
By contrast, just three of the 23 subjects make an inefficient choice in Task 3 while 
making an efficient choice in Task 2. 
The observed improvements are quite surprising. Task 3 does not 
allow for allocations that improve on those available in Task 2 and the allocations that 
were chosen in Task 2 remain feasible in Task 3. Furthermore, in Task 2, a 
considerable improvement of the choice possibilities yielded only limited changes. 
We attribute this remarkable pattern (a minor reaction to a substantial improvement of 
the choice options and a major reaction to a merely ‘cosmetic’ change) to the 
emphasis placed on the favorable diversification benefits rather than the 
unfavorable marginal distribution. Apparently, the subjects do not fully account for 
the diversification benefits of the lotteries and focus on the marginal distributions of 
the lotteries.  
The improved efficiency of the portfolios does not mitigate the conditional 1/n 
rule. In fact, a large majority (78.8 percent) of the subjects who mix B1 and B5 choose 
an equal-weighted average. However, unlike the equal weighted combination of B1 
and B2, this combination is FSD efficient and does not represent irrational behavior. 
In total, 38.3 percent of the subjects in Task 3 allocate their money evenly among two 
chosen lotteries. In contrast, only a small fraction of subjects (0.9 percent) choose the 
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equal weighted average of B1, B2 and B5, as the unconditional 1/n rule would 
predict.11 
A final remark seems in order to value the results of the first three tasks. In 
Task 1, on average only 2.9 percent weight is allocated to the third asset with the 
unattractive marginal distribution (B3). This percentage grows to 17.1 percent in Task 
2. While the 14.2 percent increase is roughly the same as the 18.6 percent increase 
from Task 2 to Task 3 and both increases are statistically significant, the logical 
inference is very different. In Task 2, an increased allocation to the third asset (B4) is 
the predicted, rational response to the improved diversification benefits of this asset. 
Our focus is instead on the significant allocations to the marginally more attractive, 
but in this task FSD dominated, second asset (B2) and the related significant decrease 
in overall efficiency. Task 3 reframes Task 2 without altering the relevant payoff 
space. This purely cosmetic change has a similar effect on the allocation to the third 
asset (B5) as the fundamental change in Task 2, and significantly improves overall 
efficiency. Our key result is that a large portion of the subjects focus on the marginal 
distributions of alternatives and thereby overlook sizeable diversification benefits (in 
Task 2), unless these benefits are pointed out to them, by showing the marginal 
distribution of a diversified portfolio (as in Task 3). 
 
D. Task 4 
Task 4 adds Lottery B6 to Task 2, resulting in four choice alternatives instead 
of three: (X1, X2, X3, X4) = (B1, B2, B4, B6). Table 3 and Graph D of Figure 2 show the 
results. The subjects respond to the additional lottery by shifting away from B1 and B2 
to B6. This shift is consistent with our earlier findings for Task 1 to Task 3. 
Specifically, this is exactly the behavioral pattern that results if subjects focus on the 
marginal distribution, and dislike alternatives with the most extreme negative 
attributes as compared to other alternatives, as widely documented in the 
psychological literature (see for example Simonson (1989), and Simonson and 
Tversky (1992)); The marginal distribution of B6 lies in between the marginal 
                                                 
11
 However, HJ note that investors instead tend to choose a 50%-25%-25% over an 
even allocation when dividing money between three funds. Our findings align with 
this observation, as respectively 9.3 percent and 6.5 percent select such an allocation 
in Task 2 and 3. 
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distributions of B1 and B2, B1 has the most extreme marginal distribution (it has the 
biggest possible loss), and we observe that preferences move away from this extreme 
option towards the middle option (B6).12 
Nevertheless, B6 is a combination of B1 and B2 and the implied allocations and 
general level of efficiency are not significantly different from those in Task 2 (p-value 
= 0.9968). This means that the frequency of inefficient choices remains high (81.3 
percent) and many subjects (27.1 percent) overlook the sizeable diversification 
benefits of B4, which has an unfavorable marginal distribution. A compelling reason 
for the insignificant decrease in overall efficiency is the large number of inefficient 
choices in Task 2, which lowers the statistical power of the contrast with Task 4. 
From the 23 subjects who make efficient choices in Task 2, seven (30.4 percent) make 
inefficient choices in Task 4, while only four of the 84 subjects (4.8 percent) who 
make inefficient choices in Task 2 make efficient choices in Task 4. Moreover, a large 
fraction of the efficient allocations are risk-neutral choices of full investment in B1, 
which are unlikely to be affected by the addition of an alternative with a lower 
average value. Correcting also for these choices leaves a small group of seven 
subjects who choose efficient but not risk-neutral combinations in Task 2. Within this 
group, four subjects (57.1 percent) select inefficient allocations in Task 4. Although 
the percentages support the notion that adding irrelevant alternatives lowers overall 
efficiency, the numbers of relevant subjects are simply too small to assign statistical 
significance to these percentages. Task 5 sheds more light on this issue.  
 
E. Task 5 
In Task 5 (see Table 3 and Graph E of Figure 2), we add B6 to Task 3: (X1, X2, 
X3, X4) = (B1, B2, B5, B6). When we compare the results of Task 5 to those of Task 4, 
we yet again see that emphasizing diversification benefits helps. Many of the 
inefficient allocations that are chosen in Task 4 (and that remain feasible in Task 5) 
are replaced with efficient choices. Most notably, we observe more exclusions of B2 
and B6 (p-value = 0.1692 and 0.0373) and less inefficient exclusions of B5 in the 
                                                 
12
 Interestingly, Benartzi and Thaler (2002) obtain similar findings when people are 
asked to choose between three hypothetical portfolios for their retirement savings 
investments.  
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portfolio (p-value = 0.0008). In total, the number of efficient choices increases 
substantially (31.8 percent vs. 18.7 percent, p-value = 0.0138). 
Nevertheless, the 13.1 percent increase is much smaller than the 29.0 percent 
increase in efficiency between Task 2 and Task 3 (p-value = 0.0022). This reduced 
effect of emphasizing the diversification benefits is caused by different allocations in 
Task 5 as compared to Task 3 (p-value = 0.0040). This is quite remarkable, since 
Task 3 and Task 5 only differ in the addition of a simple and redundant fifty-fifty 
combination of the first two lotteries, and implies that the addition of irrelevant 
alternatives changes portfolio compositions. More specifically, more subjects exclude 
B1 (29.0 percent vs. 15.9 percent, p-value = 0.0109) from their choice set, reducing 
the average allocations to B1 from 65.3 percent to 58.3 percent. By contrast, these 
subjects tend to select B6, which is an inefficient alternative because it implicitly 
includes a 50 percent allocation to B2. As in Task 4, this is in line with subjects 
focusing on the marginal distribution, while disliking alternatives with the most 
extreme negative attributes as compared to other alternatives. The shift from the 
extreme option (B1) to the middle option (B6) significantly reduces the number of 
efficient choices (31.8 percent vs. 50.5 percent, p-value = 0.0026).  
Again, many subjects follow the conditional 1/n heuristic, as shown by the 
large number of subjects who divide their money equally between B1 and B4 (85.0 
percent). Overall, the favorite number of funds for the subjects is two, of which 78.6 
percent divides their money equally between them (compared to 80.4 percent in Task 
3). By contrast, relatively few subjects (2.8 percent) follow the unconditional 1/n rule.  
 
F.  Pooled Statistical Analysis 
The analysis so far has focussed on contrasts between pairs of tasks that differ 
by the change or addition of a single lottery. This allowed us to focus on simple 
statistical methods. However, by pooling all tasks and using multivariate analysis, we 
can jointly analyze the results of all our tasks, and obtain more statistical power. We 
therefore performed a pooled multivariate statistical analysis of all observations of all 
subjects in Task 1 to Task 5.13  
We use a probit regression model where the dependent variable is a dummy 
indicating if a subject made an FSD inefficient choice (with a value of one) or not 
                                                 
13
 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.  
 23 
(with a value of zero). We try to explain this variable with the following set of 
regressors: 
 
1. A dummy variable that takes a value of one if the third, “unattractive” 
gamble has a positive statistical association with the other gambles (“Positive 
Association”), as is true in Task 1, and else zero; 
 
2. A dummy variable that takes a value of one if a diversified gamble is 
included to highlight the benefits of diversification (“Framing”), as is true in 
Tasks 3 and 5, and else zero; 
 
3. A dummy variable that takes a value of one if a fourth, irrelevant gamble is 
included (“Irrelevant Alternatives”), as is true in Task 4 and 5, and else zero; 
 
To allow for the possibility that the errors of individual subjects are correlated 
(that is, an error by a given subject in a given task may affect some of that subject’s 
subsequent choices), we perform a cluster correction at the subject level on the 
standard errors (see, for example, Wooldridge (2003)).  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
The results reported in Table 4 confirm our earlier results obtained from the 
pair-wise comparisons of tasks. Statistical association has a strong and significant 
effect. In case of positive statistical association, the probability of inefficiency is 60.5 
percent lower than in case of negative statistical association. Framing within the 
negative association tasks significantly decreases the chance on an inefficient choice 
by 22.6 percent. Finally, the addition of an irrelevant alternative to the negative 
association tasks significantly increases the probability of inefficient choice by 8.8 
percent. 
Logit regression is an obvious alternative to probit regression. Another approach 
is to use Tobit regression with the inefficiency score (censored between its minimum 
and maximum population value) as the dependent variable. Comfortably, the results 
of both alternative approaches are similar in economic magnitude and statistical 
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significance to our probit results. These pooled regression results show that our 
findings are robust to the statistical method and assumptions used.  
 
G.  SSD Portfolio Efficiency 
Our analysis thus far has focused on the FSD criterion using the FSD portfolio 
efficiency test (2). The generality of this criterion sometimes comes at the costs of 
low discriminating power. Comfortably, power does not seem to be an important issue 
in our analysis. We have found large percentages of FSD inefficient choices, 
significantly varying over the tasks between 15.0 percent in Task 1 and 81.3 percent 
in Task 4. We attribute this power to the design of our lotteries (see Section 1.1) and 
the relatively large number of subjects in our sample. 
Nevertheless, we may analyze individual portfolio choice behavior using the 
less general efficiency criterion of second-order stochastic dominance (SSD).14 This 
criterion makes the additional assumption that decision makers are globally risk 
averse, a typical assumption in traditional portfolio choice models like Markowitz 
(1952). Post (2003) develops a simple linear programming test to analyze SSD 
portfolio efficiency, which we apply to Tasks 1 to 5.  
For Task 1, the SSD efficient set is given by 
[ ]{ }0110 31213211 =−=∈= ;ww;w,:w,w,wwW** )( , which is 44 percent smaller than the FSD 
efficient set (3). The “complement set” =***\WW 11 [ ]{ }132511321 101 ww;w;,w:w,w,w −==∈)(  
contains all portfolios that are optimal for some non-satiable decision maker (FSD 
efficient) but not optimal for any risk averter (SSD inefficient). While this set is quite 
large, only 0.9 percent of our subjects choose a portfolio from it – the equal-weighted 
average of B1 and B3. Hence, 15.9 percent of the subjects make an SSD inefficient 
choice in Task 1, compared with 15 percent using the FSD rule.  
For Task 2 and Task 4, the SSD efficient set is given by 
{ }213285132142 101 yy,y,y,:y,y,yyW ** & −−==∈= ][)( , 25 percent smaller than the 
FSD efficient set (4). In this case, no subject chooses a portfolio from the complement 
set **&
*
& \WW 4242 ={ }213241811321 10 yyy,y,,y:y,y,y −−==∈ )[)( , implying that 78.5 
percent (81.3 percent) of the subjects make a SSD inefficient choice in Task 2 (Task 
4), the same percentages as for the FSD inefficiency.  
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 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.  
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For Task 3 and 5, the SSD efficient set equals the FSD efficient set, that is, 
=
**
 & W 53
*
 & W 53 , and it is not even possible for subjects to violate the SSD criterion 
without violating the FSD criterion. Therefore, 49.5 percent (68.2 percent) of the 
subjects make a SSD inefficient choice in Task 3 (Task 5), again identical to the FSD 
results. Hence, the two efficiency criteria give very similar results, suggesting that our 
conclusions are robust to the precise efficiency criterion. 
 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we examine the nature and optimality of portfolio decisions and 
use of diversification heuristics. To get insight in these complex decisions, gauge the 
optimality of choices, and avoid joint hypothesis problems due to unknown decision 
maker’s preferences, expectations and information sets, we use an experimental 
approach with well-compensated and financially trained subjects and employ recently 
developed tests for FSD portfolio efficiency.  
Our findings are as follows. A large majority of our subjects seem to focus on 
the marginal distribution of the individual choice alternatives, while ignoring possible 
diversification benefits. The subjects tend to exclude the alternatives that are 
unattractive when held in isolation (that is, alternatives that entail small potential 
gains and large potential losses), without fully accounting for their possible 
diversification benefits. In addition, in line with the findings of BT and HJ, many 
subjects tend to select an equal-weighted combination of the remaining alternatives, a 
clear manifestation of a conditional 1/n rule. This strategy is irrational in then sense 
that the resulting allocations are FSD dominated, or non-optimal for every rational 
decision maker. Hence, a large part of the subjects irrationally focus on a subset of 
choice alternatives and select an equal-weighted combination within that subset.  
We also show the importance of the framing of the decision problem. 
Emphasizing the diversification benefits rather than the marginal distribution of the 
individual choice alternatives improves decision making. In other words, many 
subjects don’t fully appreciate the effect of diversification unless these effects are 
clearly pointed out to them. In addition, we show that the addition of irrelevant 
alternatives changes portfolio allocations. Hence, problem presentation has an 
important effect on individual portfolio decisions.  
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Most real-life investment problems are substantially more demanding than the 
problems presented in our experiment, especially for household investors who are 
unfamiliar with the computer hardware and software and datasets needed for portfolio 
optimization. In these situations, the simplifying procedures shown in this study, such 
as a focus on marginal distributions and a tendency to equal weights, may be even 
more alluring. Over and above, the natural frame in which individual portfolio 
problems are presented may further reinforce this; investors can directly observe the 
marginal distribution of assets, but the statistical association between assets and the 
associated diversification benefits are less salient and accessible. Evidence supporting 
narrow framing in real-life investing includes Dorn and Huberman (2010), who show 
that investors with a discount broker focus mainly on individual asset volatilities 
instead of the portfolio volatility. In addition, Kumar and Lim (2008), find that 
household investors tend to frame stock market decisions more narrowly than other 
investors. 
For pension plans, the conditional 1/n heuristic may lead participants to focus 
on a subset of funds in the same, “attractive” asset class. Since diversification effects 
generally are stronger between asset classes than within asset classes, the resulting 
allocations may be suboptimal. In this respect, reframing portfolio problems could 
help improve pension investment choice. For example, pension plans and financial 
advisors could stress the benefits of diversification between asset classes and 
including mixed-funds that diversify across multiple asset classes. Hopefully, our 
study contributes to an increased awareness of diversification heuristics in practice 
and more attention to problem presentation and decision support.  
An irrational focus on marginal distributions may also have market-wide 
implications. A number of “anomalous” asset pricing patterns naturally emerge if 
investors care about fluctuations in the individual stocks they hold instead of 
fluctuations in their portfolio. For example, Barberis and Huang (2001) show that in 
an economy in which investors are averse to losses and this aversion depends on the 
outcomes of previous decisions, the focus of individual investors on the outcomes of 
individual stocks (i.e. the marginal distribution) results in: (i) high returns on value 
stocks relative to growth stocks (see Fama and French (1992), (1993)), (ii) high 
returns on the past loser stocks relative to winners (see De Bondt and Thaler (1985), 
(1987)), (iii) high excess returns on equities (see Mehra and Prescott (1985)), (iv) 
long term predictability of stock returns (see for example Fama and French (1988)), 
 27 
and (v) excess volatility of the stock prices over their underlying cash flows (see 
Shiller (1981)). We hope that our experimental results may provide a stimulus for 
further research along these lines. 
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TABLE 1  
Lotteries and Tasks of the Experiment 
This table summarizes the main tasks and lotteries used in our experiment. Each task 
involves three or four lotteries (X1, X2, X3 and X4) with an uncertain payoff in three 
possible scenarios (S1, S2 and S3) of equal probability (1/3). The lotteries (X1, X2, X3 
and X4) are a selection from six base lotteries (B1, B2, B3, B4, B5 and B6). 
 
 Gain/Loss (€) 
Lottery S1 S2 S3 
B1 -50 +25 +125 
B2 -25 0 +75 
B3 -75 +50 +25 
B4 +50 -75 +25 
B5* 0 -25 +75 
B6† -37.5 +12.5 +100 
  
* 
42
1
12
1
5 BBB +=  
  
† 
22
1
12
1
6 BBB +=  
   
 
 
  
 Lotteries 
Task X1 X2 X3 X4 
Task 1 B1 B2 B3 - 
Task 2 B1 B2 B4 - 
Task 3
 
B1 B2 B5 - 
Task 4 B1 B2 B4 B6 
Task 5 B1 B2 B5 B6 
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TABLE 2  
Example Illustration of the FSD Portfolio Efficiency Test 
 
A: The FSD inefficient combination )( 02121 ,,  
 Gain/Loss (€)  
 S1 S2 S3 Percent 
B1 -50 +25 +125 50 
B2 -25 0 +75 50 
B4 +50 -75 +25 0 
Total -37.5 +12.5 +100 100 
 
B: The FSD dominating combination )(
8
1
8
7 0,,  
 Gain/Loss (€)  
 S1 S2 S3 Percent 
B1 -50 +25 +125 87.5 
B2 -25 0 +75 0 
B4 +50 -75 +25 12.5 
Total -37.5 +12.5 +112.5 100 
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TABLE 3  
Summary of Allocations  
This table shows the main results of our experiment (107 subjects). For every task, the 
table shows the average allocations to each alternative, the average implied 
allocations to B1, B2 and B4, the proportion of subjects who exclude each alternative, 
the proportion of subjects who invest in one given alternative, the numbers of funds 
chosen by the subjects, the percentage of equal splits between those funds chosen, the 
proportion of subjects who rely on a specific diversification heuristic, and the 
proportion of subjects who chose a FSD inefficient allocation, as well as the Euro and 
percentage mean inefficiency score over all allocations. For Task 1 to Task 5, w1 
denotes the allocation to B1 and w2 denotes the allocation to B2. For Task 1, w3 
denotes the allocation to B3, for Task 2 and Task 4, w3 denotes the allocation to B4, 
and for Task 3 and Task 5, w3 denotes the allocation to B5. For Task 4 and Task 5, w4 
denotes the allocation to B6. For the sake of comparability with Task 2, the weights of 
Task 3 to Task 5 are also transformed to their implied allocations to B1, B2 and B4. 
The implied allocation to B1 is denoted by y1, the implied allocation to B2 by y2 and 
the implied allocation to B4 by y3. 
  Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 Task 4 Task 5 
            Average Allocations 
w1 42.9% 51.8% 47.4% 40.0% 34.4% 
w2 54.2% 31.1% 16.9% 18.9% 17.7% 
w3 2.9% 17.1% 35.7% 17.1% 32.0% 
w4 - - - 24.1% 16.0% 
      Average implied allocations to B1, B2 and B4 
y1 - 51.8% 65.3% 52.0% 58.3% 
y2 - 31.1% 16.9% 30.9% 25.7% 
y3 - 17.1% 17.9% 17.1% 16.0% 
 
     Excluded Alternatives 
w1=0 28.0% 9.3% 15.9% 18.7% 29.0% 
w2=0 18.7% 33.6% 54.2% 45.8% 52.3% 
w3=0 84.1% 43.0% 18.7% 39.3% 23.4% 
w4=0 - - - 40.2% 52.3% 
 
     Invested in One Alternative 
w1=1 17.8% 15.0% 15.0% 12.1% 13.1% 
w2=1 28.0% 9.3% 1.9% 5.6% 1.9% 
w3=1 0.0% 0.0% 3.7% 0.0% 1.9% 
w4=1 - - - 1.9% 2.8% 
 
     Number of Funds Chosen 
1 chosen 45.8% 24.3% 20.6% 19.6% 19.6% 
2 chosen 39.3% 37.4% 47.7% 30.8% 39.3% 
3 chosen 15.0% 38.3% 31.8% 23.4% 19.6% 
4 chosen - - - 26.2% 21.5% 
 
     
 36 
Equal Split Between Number of Funds Chosen (as Percentage of Funds Chosen) 
2 chosen 31.0% 47.5% 80.4% 42.4% 78.6% 
3 chosen 6.3% 7.3% 2.9% 12.0% 14.3% 
4 chosen - - - 32.1% 13.0% 
 
     Diversification Heuristics 
Uncond. 1/n 0.9% 2.8% 0.9% 8.4% 2.8% 
Cond. 1/n 12.1% 17.8% 38.3% 15.9% 35.5% 
      FSD-Efficiency 
Efficient 85.0% 21.5% 50.5% 18.7% 31.8% 
Inefficient 15.0% 78.5% 49.5% 81.3% 68.2% 
Mean Inefficiency (€) €1.09 €3.76 €1.73 €3.86 €2.28 
Mean Inefficiency (%) 4.7% 16.7% 7.0% 17.2% 9.6% 
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TABLE 4  
Probit Regression Analysis  
The table displays the results from a probit regression analysis of the decisions made 
in our experiment (107 subjects). The dependent variable is the FSD efficiency 
dummy, with a value of 1 for “Inefficient” and 0 for “Efficient.” We use all subjects’ 
choices of Task 1 to Task 5. Apart from the maximum likelihood estimates and 
marginal effects (that is, the change in the likelihood on subjects selecting an 
inefficient choice) of the regression coefficients, the table reports the log-likelihood 
(LL), McFadden’s R-squared, and the number of observations. The p-values (within 
parentheses) are corrected for correlation between the responses of a given subject 
(subject-level cluster correction). Asterisks are used to indicate significance at a 5% 
(*), 1% (**) or 0.1% (***) level.  
  Coefficient Marginal effect 
        Positive Association -1.726*** -60.5% 
 
(0.000) 
 
Framing -0.617*** -22.6% 
 
(0.000)  
 
Irrelevant Alternatives
 
0.315*** 8.8% 
 
(0.000)  
 
Constant 0.688*** 75.4% 
 
(0.000)  
 
LL -294.51  
McFadden R2 0.189  
No. obs. 535  
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 FIGURE 1 
FSD Inefficiency Scores for Task 1 to Task 5 
The figure shows the FSD inefficiency score )( 321 w,w,wθ  for all possible 
allocations in Task 1 to Task 5. The FSD inefficiency score measures the maximum 
possible increase in the mean outcome that can be achieved with a combination that 
FSD dominates the evaluated combination. Graph A shows the FSD inefficiency 
scores for Task 1, Graph B shows the scores for Tasks 2 and 4, and Graph C shows 
the scores for Tasks 3 and 5. For the sake of comparability with Task 2, the weights of 
Task 3 to Task 5 are transformed to their implied allocations for Task 2. The implied 
allocation to B1 is denoted by y1, the implied allocation to B2 by y2 and the implied 
allocation to B4 by y3. The figure shows all feasible combinations of w1 (or y1) and w2 
(or y2), using 10% intervals. The weight w3 (or y3) is not shown, because it can be 
found as the residual 213 1 www −−=  (or 213 1 yyy −−= ).  
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Graph B: Task 2 & 4 
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Graph C: Task 3 & 5 
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FIGURE 2  
Test Results for Task 1 to Task 5 
The figure shows the chosen allocations in Task 1 to Task 5 in Graph A to Graph E. 
For the sake of comparability with Task 2, the weights of Task 3 to Task 5 are 
transformed to their implied allocations for Task 2. The implied allocation to B1 is 
denoted by y1, the implied allocation to B2 by y2 and the implied allocation to B4 by y3. 
The weight w3 (or y3) is not shown, because it can be found as the residual 
213 1 www −−=  (or 213 1 yyy −−= ). The chosen percentages are first rounded to 
the nearest multiple of 10%, yielding 11 categories [ ),., 0500 [ ) ,,.,. L150050 [ ]1950 ,.  for 
the allocation to every lottery. The grey bars indicate FSD efficient choices, while the 
numbers indicate the main equal-weighted allocations as percentage of all choices. 
 
Graph A: Task 1 
0.00
0.50
1.00
0.00
0.50
1.00
28.0%
11.2%
0.9%
17.8%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
(N
=
10
7)
w 2
w 1
 
 41 
 
Graph B: Task 2 
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Graph C: Task 3 
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Graph D: Task 4 
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Graph E: Task 5 
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Appendix: The Test Form 
 
EXPERIMENT INVESTMENT AND PORTFOLIO DECISIONS 
 
You are about to participate in an experiment about investment and portfolio 
decisions. This experiment will last about 60-90 minutes. We will ask you to make 
investment decisions in nine different situations. By participating in this experiment, 
it is likely, but not sure, that you will earn real money. The purpose and working of 
the experiment will be explained below. On the back side of this page, we will explain 
how the payment procedure is arranged. Please read these two pages with care. If you 
finished reading them, please wait until we give the sign that you can start fulfilling 
the nine decision tasks. If you have any questions, please raise your hand.  
 
Purpose of the Experiment: Imagine that you have some money available which you 
want to invest in financial assets. What would your portfolio of assets look like? How 
much, and in which assets would you invest? In this experiment, we want you to 
answer this question in nine tasks. In each task we will provide you with all the 
necessary information about the investment opportunities that are available on the 
market. First we will give an example, to clarify the objective of the experiment. 
 
Example You may choose a combination of three lotteries (L10, L11 and L12). The 
lotteries involve a different gain or loss in three different scenarios (S1, S2 and S3). 
Every scenario has the same probability of occurring (1/3). The table below 
summarizes the gambles and the gain or loss in each scenario. Please indicate the 
percentage you would distribute to each lottery in the last column. Negative 
percentages are not allowed. Also, please fill in the resulting gain or loss of your 
combination in the last row. 
 
  Gain/Loss (€)   
  S1 S2 S3 % 
L10 -200 0 +200   
L11 -100 +100 +300   
L12 +100 -200 +400   
Total       100 
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Example answer if you decide to distribute 10% to L10, 0% to L11 and 90% to L12: 
 
 
 
 
 
∗ Since the percentages for L11, L11 
and L12 are 10%, 0% and 90% 
respectively, the outcome in 
scenario S1 is (0.10 × -200) + (0 × -
100 ) + (0.90 × +100) = +70. 
 
If the example is clear, please turn to the next page at the backside of this form. 
  Gain/Loss (€)   
  S1 S2 S3 % 
L10 -200 0 +200 10  
L11 -100 +100 +300  0 
L12 +100 -200 +400  90 
Total +70*  -180  +380  100 
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Payment procedure: Your answer to one randomly selected task will be played for 
real money. Which task will not be known in advance by anyone, but will instead be 
determined by throwing a ten-sided dice at the end of this experiment. Hence, 
remember that which task will be played for real money is completely random, but 
that you know for sure this task will be one of your played tasks. We do this to 
encourage you to answer each task as if that one will be played for real money, 
because each task has the same probability to be played for real money. So we advise 
you to answer each task as if that task is played for real money for sure.  
 
After everyone has completed all the tasks you will be asked to come forward, put 
possible money that you can loose on the table and throw the ten-sided dice. The 
number that comes up will be the task that you play for real money. . For example, if 
you throw “3”, we will take your answer to Task 3 and play that answer for real 
money. Throwing a “0” (zero) means “throwing again.” Subsequently, you will be 
asked to throw the dice again to determine which scenario (S1, S2 or S3) is realized. A 
throw of “1”, “2” or “3” means that S1 is realized, “4”, “5” and  “6” refer to S2, and 
“7”, “8” and “9” yield S3. Anyone who would like to test the dice is requested to raise 
her hand.  
 
Since we are interested in investment decision making, there will also be a possibility 
that you lose money. Think of it: investments are almost never without risk. To 
compensate for these possible losses, each of you will receive €10 for participating in 
this experiment. In addition, you will receive €15 if you participate in a half-hour 
questionnaire, which will take place after this experiment. Hence, everyone will 
receive up to €25 plus the outcome of one randomly selected task. We want to stress 
that you may end up losing money, but that this only occurs if you want to take the 
risk. People who are not willing to participate in this experiment are kindly request to 
raise their hands. After the completion of the experiment, we will handle the payment 
of your possible earnings. 
 
If you finished reading the instructions, please wait until we give the sign that you can 
start fulfilling the nine decision tasks. If you have any question, please raise your 
hand.  
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Task 1: There are three lotteries (L1, L2 and L3). The lotteries involve a different gain 
or loss in three different scenarios (S1, S2 and S3). Every scenario has the same 
probability of occurring (1/3). The table below summarizes the gambles and the gain 
or loss in each scenario. Which portfolio of these lotteries would you like to hold? 
Please indicate the percentage you would distribute to each lottery in the last column. 
Negative percentages are not allowed. Also, please fill in the resulting gain or loss of 
your combination in the last row. 
 
 
  Gain/Loss (€)   
  S1 S2 S3 % 
L1 -50 +25 +125   
L2 -25 0 +75   
L3 -75 +50 +25   
Total       100 
 
 
 
 
 
Task 2: Now there are the following three lotteries (L1, L2 and L4). The lotteries 
involve a different gain or loss in three different scenarios (S1, S2 and S3). Every 
scenario has the same probability of occurring (1/3). The table below summarizes the 
gambles and the gain or loss in each scenario. Which portfolio of these lotteries would 
you like to hold? Please indicate the percentage you would distribute to each lottery in 
the last column. Negative percentages are not allowed. Also, please fill in the 
resulting gain or loss of your combination in the last row. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Gain/Loss (€)   
  S1 S2 S3 % 
L1 -50 +25 +125   
L2 -25 0 +75   
L4 +50 -75 +25   
Total       100 
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Task 3: Now there are the following three lotteries (L1, L2 and L5). The lotteries 
involve a different gain or loss in three different scenarios (S1, S2 and S3). Every 
scenario has the same probability of occurring (1/3). The table below summarizes the 
gambles and the gain or loss in each scenario. Which portfolio of these lotteries would 
you like to hold? Please indicate the percentage you would distribute to each lottery in 
the last column. Negative percentages are not allowed. Also, please fill in the 
resulting gain or loss of your combination in the last row. 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Task 4 Now there are the four lotteries (L1, L2, L4 and L6). The lotteries involve a 
different gain or loss in three different scenarios (S1, S2 and S3). Every scenario has 
the same probability of occurring (1/3). The table below summarizes the gambles and 
the gain or loss in each scenario. Which portfolio of these lotteries would you like to 
hold? Please indicate the percentage you would distribute to each lottery in the last 
column. Negative percentages are not allowed. Also, please fill in the resulting gain or 
loss of your combination in the last row. 
 
  Gain/Loss (€)   
  S1 S2 S3 % 
L1 -50 +25 +125   
L2 -25 0 +75   
L4 +50 -75 +25   
L6 -37.5 +12.5 +100   
Total       100 
 
 
  Gain/Loss (€)   
  S1 S2 S3 % 
L1 -50 +25 +125   
L2 -25 0 +75   
L5 0 -25 +75   
Total       100 
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Task 5: Now there are the following four lotteries (L1, L2, L5 and L6). The lotteries 
involve a different gain or loss in three different scenarios (S1, S2 and S3). Every 
scenario has the same probability of occurring (1/3). The table below summarizes the 
gambles and the gain or loss in each scenario. Which portfolio of these lotteries would 
you like to hold? Please indicate the percentage you would distribute to each lottery in 
the last column. Negative percentages are not allowed. Also, please fill in the 
resulting gain or loss of your combination in the last row. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your cooperation!  
 
  Gain/Loss (€)   
  S1 S2 S3 % 
L1 -50 +25 +125   
L2 -25 0 +75   
L5 0 -25 +75   
L6 -37.5 +12.5 +100   
Total       100 
